WILKI LEAKS

[speedway]

They have had this on the news again based upon another 250 some thousand more documents leaked. Its hard to understand how A Private First Class would even have access to this material much less have the amount of time to download it and send to this Wilkileaks site. Whats next they have only released 257 copies out of 250 some thousand to go.

http://wikileaks.org/

Speedway

 

[bloomsman]

As you point out how does this young GI get access to all this classified information? After 37 years of military and civil service with all sorts of clearances working at both the War College and the SecDef, I find this hard to believe. Whatever happened to "need to know"? Not only did he give military secrets away he had State Dept. information that will only serve to embarrass the United States. John

 

[mswaim]

Sounds like the Military/Government version of the internet (SIPRNET) has gone the way of every "secure" network.

With millions of daily users, all with "security clearance", password restrictions ease up in response to user complaints of forgotten, lost or compromised passwords/usernames.

Strict rules regarding portable storage tools ease up as the need for "one-off" variances grow.

I recently read an article in a trade magazine discussing an alert function which triggers on suspicious use. The author noted the function was disabled on most connection points in Iraq following complaints from end users it was inconvenient, slowing the system down with false positive alerts.

At the end of the day, no matter how secure the network, it comes down to people, and nothing is more reliably fallible than people.

 

[ChicagoDave]

Sounds like the Military/Government version of the internet (SIPRNET) has gone the way of every "secure" network.

With millions of daily users, all with "security clearance", password restrictions ease up in response to user complaints of forgotten, lost or compromised passwords/usernames.

Strict rules regarding portable storage tools ease up as the need for "one-off" variances grow.

I recently read an article in a trade magazine discussing an alert function which triggers on suspicious use. The author noted the function was disabled on most connection points in Iraq following complaints from end users it was inconvenient, slowing the system down with false positive alerts.

At the end of the day, no matter how secure the network, it comes down to people, and nothing is more reliably fallible than people.

Like an article I read stated: "You cannot stop a pilot from crashing the plane into the ground" ... personnel are HUMAN and anyone can "crack". Its a shame that there are such NARROW MINDED, SELF SERVING people that have access to such sensitive information.

 

[mswaim]

There are millions of government employees, including contractors with security clearance, none of them have been subjected to a standardized psychological exam.

Every police officer in our state must pass such an exam, along with a polygraph. The polygraph is used in some security level backgrounds, but none of them require a psychological exam, unless there is evidence of mental instability or existing medical history.

The problem is, it is easy to slip through the process. A properly administered psychological exam is very difficult to defeat and would vet out those with underlying personality issues.

But we are talking about government employees, conducting clearance checks on potential government employees...........much like the blind leading the blind.

 

[speedway]

There are millions of government employees, including contractors with security clearance, none of them have been subjected to a standardized psychological exam.

Every police officer in our state must pass such an exam, along with a polygraph. The polygraph is used in some security level backgrounds, but none of them require a psychological exam, unless there is evidence of mental instability or existing medical history.

The problem is, it is easy to slip through the process. A properly administered psychological exam is very difficult to defeat and would vet out those with underlying personality issues.

But we are talking about government employees, conducting clearance checks on potential government employees...........much like the blind leading the blind.

There is absolutely no reason for this private First Class to have access to these documents. Just because you have a security clearance does not mean you have access to everything classified. Its based on the NEED TO KNOW. General Officers do not have the ability to view classified documents that they do not have a NEED TO KNOW. On top of all of this why on earth it would be nessicary to have State Department Documents concerning Countries that are not even within the Area of Opertions is obsurd to say the least. In fact with all that said I find this to be extremely derelick and incomprehensible in both the Military and State Departments Chain of Command for this even have taken place. Below is what this Private First Class job decription is.



http://www.us-army-info.com/pages/mos/intelligence/96b.html

Speedway

 

[mswaim]

The problem with the entire SIPRNET/NCD database/network is it was designed to allow anyone with proper clearance the ability to access any information therein contained.

Prior to 9/11; each agency stored their own information, making it impossible for someone a continent away to access information they needed.

Post 9/11; the decision was made to break down the information silos and create a secure network operating off the WWW but with similar access protocols.

Great concept; but its weak link as is in every situation is the people who utilize the network.

Department heads too lazy to do their own research, so they provide their passwords to their aides who then share with others.

The dumb-bunnies who cannot remember the complicated, 10 character letter/number/special character password, so they write it down on a sticky note and attach it to the terminal.

But; as a temporary fix (and long after the damage has been done) the President has decided to break the link between the State Department's NCD servers from the DOD's SIPRNET servers.

Now if you want to steal State secrets you will have to access their files directly, same for DOD files..............

 

[speedway]

I wonder where this is headed??? Doomsday

At the bottom of this link is wiki leaks new site they have archived and organized all there messages so there easier to read


http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474978759732

Speedway